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NOTE
EFFECT OF SECTION 8(b)(1)(A) OF THE TAFT-
HARTLEY ACT ON PEACEFUL PICKETING AND
RELATED ACTIVITIES OF MINORITY UNIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides in part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7 .... I
Section 7 of the act guarantees to employees the right, among others,
to refrain from participation in union organization and collective
bargaining.2
In a series of recent cases3 the National Labor Relations Board4
has been called upon to determine the scope and effect of section
8(b) (1) (A) on peaceful picketing and related activities 5 by mi-
nority or stranger unions. The purpose of this Note is to examine
two of these decisions and evaluate the Board's interpretation of
that section of the act.
A. The Curtis Case
Local 639 was certified in 1953 by the NLRB as the exclusive
bargaining representative for Curtis Brothers' employees. After an
impasse had been reached in the resultant collective bargaining, the
union began to picket the company's premises. This picketing con-
tinued into 1955 when the employer petitioned for a new represen-
tation election. The Board directed an election which the union lost.
Thereafter the union posted pickets carrying signs which publicized
the fact that the firm employed nonunion men and which appealed
to the employees to join the union. The employer filed an unfair
labor practice charge in 1956 claiming that the union's conduct con-
stituted a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A). Relying on prior case
1. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat 452 (1935), as amended by
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b) (1) (A) (1952) (herein referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act).
2. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
3. In November, 1957, there were sLx such cases before the Board. See
Jenkins, NLRB Rules on Picketing for Recognition, 40 Lab. Rel. Rep. 472,
474 n.8 (1957).
4. Herein referred to as the NLRB or as the Board.
5. Herein the words "picketing," "related activities," "organized ac-
tivity," and similar terms, will be used to refer to any activity engaged in by
a labor organization whereby it uses its economic power to boycott or request
boycott of an employer's business.
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law and the legislative history of the act, the trial examiner con-
cluded that 8(b) (1) (A) could not be applied to peaceful minority
picketing regardless of its objective.6
Nearly a year later the Board overruled this finding, holding
that picketing by a minority union to secure immediate recognition
"restrains and coerces" employees within the meaning of section
8(b) (1) (A). 7 The Board reasoned that: (1) the union intends, by
such picketing, to cause economic loss to the employer while he re-
fuses to recognize the union as bargaining agent for his employees;
(2) this in turn puts pressure on the employees whose job security
is jeopardized by the possible loss of business to the employer; and,
(3) thus, the union has coerced the employees in their right to re-
frain from joining the union.
B. The Alloy Case
This reasoning was extended in the Alloy Mfg. Co. case, 8 de-
cided a week after Curtis. In this case the union, which represented
no more than two of the firm's twelve employees, demanded that the
employer sign a union shop agreement. When the employer refused,
the union placed the employer's name on its "we do not patronize"
list. The employer petitioned for an election, and the union informed
the Board that it did not claim to represent any of the employees
but expressed its intent to inform the public that the employer did
not employ union help and that the existing conditions governing
employment were unfair to organized labor. The Board ordered an
election in which the union received no votes. A single picket was
then stationed at the employer's premises carrying a banner which
declared that the employees were "nonunion!' and "unfair."
The trial examiner found that the union's picketing which was
aimed at winning a union shop violated section 8(b) (2) of the act,0
but refused to find that the picketing and distribution of the "we do
not patronize" lists violated section 8(b) (1) (A). The Board over-
ruled the latter finding, holding that since appeals to consumers and
"we do not patronize" lists contain the same threats to the em-
ployees' livelihood as does picketing, these activities by a minority
union seeking the unlawful objective of immediate recognition vio-
lated section 8(b) (1) (A).'Moreover, the Board made it clear that
6. Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report and Recommended Order,
Case No. 5-CB-190 (1956).
7. Local 639, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO and Curtis
Bros., Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 33, Lab. Rel. Rep. (41 L.R.R.M. 1025) (1957).
8. Lodge 942, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-CIO and Alloy Mfg. Co.,
119 N.L.R.B. No. 38, Lab. Rel. Rep. (41 L.R.R.M. 1058) (1957).
9. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1059.
[Vol. 42:459
NOTE
rejection by the employees in an election is not an essential element
of the unfair labor practice.10
Member Murdock dissented from both cases. He argued that
the legislative history and prior precedent disclosed that section
8(b) (1) (A) does not prohibit peaceful union activity whatever its
purpose. He objected strenuously to the Board's broad theory of
"coercion," arguing that it would apply equally well to all picketing
and related activities by labor organizations.
This Note will evaluate the determination that Congress author-
ized the NLRB to proscribe these peaceful minority union activities
through application of section 8(b) (1) (A), and will examine the
implications of the new broad theory of "coercion"e adopted by the
Board in these two cases. This will be facilitated by the presentation
of two complete arguments, pro and con. The final section will be
designed to offer some constructive criteria essential to any sound
solution of the problem of minority picketing.
II. CURTIS AND ALLOY: THE CASE AGAINST
Often repeated, almost a clich6, is the proposition that "hard
cases make bad law." The facts of the Curtis case are "hard." In a
fairly conducted election, the union lost its opportunity to represent
the company's employees by an overwhelming majority.1 Yet the
union continued to picket for recognition, publicizing the fact that
the company employed nonunion men, and claiming that the firm
and its employees were "unfair to Teamsters."' 2 In the Alloy case
the union went further, placing the employer on its "we do not pa-
tronize" list which was widely circulated.13 In both cases the Board
found that the union activity constituted "coercion" of employees in
their right to remain free from union representation, and thus vio-
lated section 8(b) (1) (A) of the act.
It is difficult for an academician to find reasonable justification
for the union's conduct in these cases, or to argue that justice re-
quires that such conduct should be free from regulation. It appears
likely that the union's purpose in continuing picketing under these
circumstances was to harass the employer, or to force him to impose
an unwanted union upon his employees. Either employer would have
committed an unfair labor practice if, in an effort to protect his busi-
ness, he had given in to the union's demands and recognized it as
10. Id. at 1059 n.2.
11. In the Curtis case twenty-eight employees voted against the union
and only two voted for it. In Alloy, the margin was even greater, the union
receiving io votes out of a total of twelve cast.
12. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1025.
13. Id. at 1058.
19581
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bargaining agent for his employees.1 4 It would seem only fair that
the law provide some relief to the employer and his employees from
these economic boycotts, and some protection to the public from the
resulting industrial unrest.
However, central to the issues involved in these two cases is not
the question of the desirability of this type of union activity, nor
whether or not it should be regulated, but simply whether or not
Congress intended that it be prohibited by section 8(b) (1) (A) of
the act. The purpose of the following argument is to show that in
its effort to provide relief for the employer in these two "hard" cases.
the Board misconstrued the congressional intent behind that section,
and made law which will have significant and far-reaching effect on
the legality of all peaceful union activity.
A. An Historical Resum6
To best evaluate the Board's determination that the congres-
sional intent behind section 8(b) (1) (A) justifies proscription of
this peaceful union activity, it is necessary to consider the climate
which lead to enactment of this provision of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The early growth of unionization in this country was impeded
during the nineteenth century by judicial readiness to enjoin orga-
nized labor activity whenever its objective was thought by the courts
to be "unlawful."' 15 Dissatisfaction with the results of this willing-
ness to interfere in labor disputes led to legislation in 1932 in the
form of a federal anti-injunction statute, the Norris-La Guardia
Act.16 Proponents of this bill had argued that: courts were unsuited
to interfere in cases involving primarily questions of social and eco-
nomic policy; issuance of an injunction in a labor dispute failed to
resolve its underlying problems; and the end result of such an in-
junction was merely to deprive organized labor of its only really
effective weapon.'" By enacting Norris-La Guardia, Congress suc-
14. Recognition of a minority union constitutes a violation of §§ 8(a) (1),
8(a) (2). See, e.g., International Metal Products Co. and United Steelworkers,
CIO and Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 104 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1953).
15. See, e.g., Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900);
Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912 (8th Cir. 1897) ; Frankfurter and
Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) ; Gregory, Labor and the Law 83-104
(1946) ; Warm, A Study of the Judicial Attitude Toward Trade Unions and
Labor Legislation, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 255 (1939).
16. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952). See Witte, The
Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 638 (1932).
17. See Cox, Labor Law 106-12 (3d ed. 1954) ; Frankfurter and Greene,
The Labor Injunction passin (1930) ; Gregory, Labor and the Law 95-104
(1946) ; Warm, supra note 15, at 300-13; Witte, Social Consequences of In-junctions in Labor Disputes, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 772 (1930) ; Witte, The Federal
Anti-Injunction Act, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 638, 647-50 (1932).
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ceeded in immunizing in the federal courts all peaceful labor activity
regardless of its purpose or objective."5
Thus, a philosophy of judicial nonintervention into peacefully
conducted union activity was established as federal policy. This
policy was extended by passage in 1935 of the Wagner Act, which
sought to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted ac-
tivities free from employer interference. 19 This statute stated as a
declaration of national policy governmental encouragement of the
practice of union organization and collective bargaining.
20
Enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act expressed congressional re-
jection of a complete laissez-faire approach to union activities. This
statute provided for the use by the NLRB of the cease and desist
order to regulate certain practices of unions which experience had
shown to be unwarranted and undesirable. 21 Individual employees
were guaranteed, in addition to the right to join labor organizations,
the "right to refrain from any or all such activities. ' 22 It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the basic philosophy behind Norris-La
Guardia was not altered by the Taft-Hartley Act. Labor organi-
zations were to remain free from judicial intervention into their
peacefully conducted activities, except those which Congress had
specifically designated as unfair labor practices. 23 The first of these
exceptions, section 8(b) (1) (A), provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization to "restrain or coerce" employees
in their rights guaranteed by section 7.2'
B. The Plain Meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A)
In the Curtis case the Board held that peaceful recognition pick-
eting by a minority union clearly falls within the plain meaning of
18. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231-36 (1941).
For a discussion of the Minnesota counterpart to Norris-LaGuardia, see Mc-
Clintock, The Minnesota Labor Dispute Injunction Act, 21 Minn. L. Rev.
619 (1937).
19. 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
20. Ibid.
21. The powers of the Board to enforce its orders are set out at 61
Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1952).
22. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
23. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665,
673 (1951) ("By § 13, Congress has made it clear that . . . [any part of the
act] which otherwise might be read so as to interfere with, impede or diminish
the union's traditional right to strike, may be so read only if such interference
* . .is "specifically provided for' in the Act.") (Emphasis added) ; Garner v.
Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485, 499 (1953) ("The detailed prescription
of a procedure for restraint of specified types of picketing would seem to imply
that other picketing is to be free of other methods and sources of restraint.").
The union unfair labor practices created by section 8(b) are critically
analyzed in Foley, Union Unfair Labor Practices Under the Taft-Hartley
Act, 33 Va. L. Rev. 697 (1947).
24. 49 Stat 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1952).
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section 8(b) (1) (A). The rationale on which this determination
was based is that the economic pressure which is exerted on an em-
ployer by this picketing coerces those employees who do not desire
union representation. Because of the possibility of reduced wages or
loss of their jobs, the employees are not free to choose or reject un-
ion representation. In the Alloy case the Board extended this theory
of coercion, holding that the plain meaning of 8(b) (1) (A) also
prohibits such activity as (1) picketing for a union shop by a mi-
nority union; (2) appeals by a minority union to the employer's
consumers stating that the firm is unfair because it is nonunion; and
(3) placing the firm on the union's "we do not patronize" list.
It is not the purpose of this argument to enter into the contro-
versy over whether or not peaceful picketing is in fact "coercive,' ' -
but rather to evaluate the determination by the Board in Curtis and
Alloy that this peaceful minority-union activity "coerces" employees
in the sense intended by Congress in 8(b) (1) (A). That the plain
meaning of this section does not so clearly indicate a congressional
intent to regulate peaceful union activity of this type is perhaps best
demonstrated by the fact that prior to its decision in Curtis the
Board had consistently rejected the theory of coercion now adopted.
The first Board decision interpreting 8(b) (1) (A) involved
picketing and a strike by a majority union seeking a hiring-hall
contract . 2 The trial examiner had found that this conduct consti-
tuted coercion of employees to join the union and thus violated
8(b) (1) (A). He reasoned that the effect of forcing the hiring-hall
provision on the employer would be to compel those who sought
employment to first join the union, and would coerce present em-
ployees to join or retain membership in the union. The Board re-
jected this finding, commenting that this theory of coercion would
require outlawing all strikes and picketing which might be opposed
by any of the employees. Relying heavily on the legislative history
of the act, the Board concluded that the union had not violated
8(b) (1) (A) since there was no evidence of physical violence or
intimidation to compel individuals to join the union.
25. There is much discussion in the literature dealing with whether or
not peaceful picketing actually "coerces" anyone. For an example of one inter-
e-sting and provocative debate, compare Jones, Picketing and Coercion: A
Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1023 (1953), with Gregory, Picket-
ing and Coercion: A Defense, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1953). After lengthy
and fascinating debate, Professor Gregory somewhat grudgingly agrees that
perhaps peaceful picketing should not be categorized as "coercion" in the
derogatory sense. His parting comment is: "So, what?" See Gregory, Picket-
ing and Coercion: A Conclusion, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1067, 1069 (1953).
26. National Maritime Union, CIO and The Texas Co., 78 N.L.R.B.
971 (1948).
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Consequently, until Curtis, the Board found violations of 8(b)
(1) (A) only in such cases as exertion of physical force against em-
ployees; - threats of force28 or economic reprisal -9 against em-
ployees; and nonpeaceful picketing which prevented ingress to
work. 0 In a long line of cases, the Curtis theory that peaceful pick-
eting is itself "coercive" was urged on the Board but rejected sum-
marily. In each case there was present the possibility of economic
loss to the employer and a resulting decrease of earnings or loss of
jobs to the employees. In each case the particular union activity
affected the employees' right to choose or reject union representa-
tion. Yet the Board found, without exception, that peacefully con-
ducted picketing did not constitute "coercion" of employees in the
sense intended by Congress in 8(b) (1) (A). 3'
27. E.g., Painters' Dist. Council No. 6, Brotherhood of Painters, AFL
and The Higbee Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951) (pushing and jostling an em-
ployee by a picket; assault on an employee by pickets); United Constr.
Workers, Dist. 50, United Mine Workers and Kanawha Coal Operators'
Ass'n, 94 N.L.R.B. 1731 (1951) (refusal of pickets to permit employee to
unload his truck) ; United Furniture Workers, CIO and Smith Cabinet Mfg.
Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 886 (1949) (carrying sticks and open piling of bricks by
pickets; goon-squad mass assaults upon various non-striking employees).
28. E.g., Local 169, Industrial Div. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL
and Ann Bodrog, 111 N.L.R.B. 460 (1955) ("Anyone who works for us will
always be protected. If not... watch out from then on . . . if they catch
anybody organizing CIO we'd get rid of them."); Randolph Corp. and
Charles Chandler, 89 N.L.R.B. 1490 (1950) ("If you go to work in the morn-
ing there will be trouble: guns, knives and blackjacks.., and I don't know
what all....") ; Teamsters Union, AFL and Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B.
972 (1949) ("We do not want to catch you around town making de-
liveries. .... ).
29. E.g., Peerless Tool and Engineering Co. and Marlin Taylor, 111
N.L.R.B. 853 (1955) (threats that it would not process grievances for em-
ployees who failed to pay an assessment to the union strike fund) ; Pinkerton's
Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc. and Thomas W. Stenhouse, 90 N.L.R.B. 205(1950) (threats of expulsion from jobs unless employees retained union
membership and paid dues; strike to compel employer to discharge em-
ployees who failed to pay back dues) ; Clara-Val Packing Co. and Nora E.
Stiers, 87 N.L.R.B. 703 (1949) (union expelled an employee from xfiember-
ship because she failed to honor a picket line, then forced employer to dis-
charge her under its union shop agreement) ; Seamprufe, Inc. and Interna-
tional Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL, 82 N.L.R.B. 892 (1949) (threat
that those who do not join the union will lose their jobs: "We have ways
of handling people like you. .. ").
30. E.g., Local 1150, United Elec. Workers, CIO and Cory Corp., 84
N.L.R.B. 972 (1949) (mass picketing which barred employees ingress and
egress to their jobs) ; International Longshoreman's Union, CIO and Sunset
Line and Twine Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1948) (forcibly blocking the ingress
of employees' automobiles to the place of work).
31. See, e.g., District 50, United Mine Workers and Tungsten Mining
Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 903 (1953) (illegal strike for recognition held violative
of 8(b) (4) (C), but not 8(b) (1) (A)); Painters' Dist. Council No. 6,
Brotherhood of Painters, AFL and The Higbee Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951)
(strike and picketing for the purpose of inducing the employees to withdraw
the decertification petition does not violate 8(b) (1) (A)) ; Medford Bldg.
and Constr. Trades Council, AFL and Kogap Lumber Industries, 96 N.L.R.B.
165 (1951) (illegal strike and picketing directed toward compelling the corn-
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Most illustrative of these cases is Watson's Specialty Store,32
where after the employees had refused to join the union, the union
attempted to force the employer to sign a closed-shop contract cov-
ering these employees. When he refused, the union began to picket
the store. The general counsel argued that picketing by a union
which represented none of the employees constituted economic coer-
cion of lWatson's employees to join, and therefore violated section
8(b) (1) (A). The Board rejected this argument, stressing the fact
that there was present no attempt to keep customers out of the store
or to interfere in any way with the employees on their way to or
from work. Relying on the legislative history of 8(b) (1) (A), the
Board held that this picketing did not constitute "restraint or coer-
cion" of the employees; rather its effect was to demonstrate to the
nonunion workers that it was to their advantage to become union
members.
Yet in Curtis the Board finds that peaceful picketing by two
unionmen at the customer entrance of an employer's business, and
in Alloy that distribution of a "we do not patronize" list coerces
employees within the clear meaning of 8(b) (1) (A). Rejecting its
previous approach, the Board states that if the union activity has a
restraining or coercive effect on the employees, and "if such coercion
cuts into their privilege to choose or reject any particular union, the
only 2 essential elements of the unfair labor practice spelled in Sec-
tion 8(b) (1) (A) have been established." 33 The majority opinion
dismisses the long line of earlier precedent as "dubious" authority,34
and relies for its novel conclusion on dictum from a series of Su-
preme Court cases which dealt exclusively with the constitutional
power of a state to regulate picketing.
pany to accept a discriminatory contract did not violate 8(b) (1) (A));
United Constr. Workers, Dist. 50, United Mine Workers and Kanawah Coal
Operators' Ass'n, 94 N.L.R.B. 1731 (1951) (strike and picketing to achieve
the unlawful objective of a closed shop contract held not to violate
8(b) (1) (A)); Miami Copper Co. and Local Union No. 518, Int'l Brother-
hood of Elec. Workers, 92 N.L.P.B. 322 (1950) (strike to force employer
to adjust grievances of employees with a minority union held not to violate
8(b) (1) (A)); Lumber Workers Union, AFL and Santa Ana Lumber Co.,
87 N.L.R.B. 937 (1949) (picketing and strike by a minority union for recog-
nition and a union shop contract in the absence of violence or threats held not
to violate 8(b) (1) (A)) ; Perry Norvell Co. and United Shoe Workers, CIO,
80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948) (picketing by minority union seeking recognition held
not to violate 8(b) (1) (A) in the absence of violence, intimidation or threats) ;
Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL and Watson's Specialty
Store, 80 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948) (peaceful picketing by a union which repre-
sented none of the employees held not to violate 8(b) (1) (A)).
32. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL and Watson's
Specialty Store, 80 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948).
33. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1026.
34. Id. at 1031.
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C. The Legislative History
It is interesting to note that on the Senate floor the charge was
made that 8(b) (1) (A) might be read literally to outlaw peaceful
picketing. Senator Taft, the leading proponent of the act, stated in
reply:
I can see nothing in the pending measure which . . . would in
some way outlaw strikes. It would outlaw threats against em-
ployees. It would not outlaw anybody striking who wanted to
strike. It would not prevent anyone using the strike in a legiti-
mate way, conducting peaceful picketing or employing persua-
sion. All it would do would be to outlaw such restraint and coer-
cion as would prevent people from going to work if they wished
to go to work.3 5 (Emphasis added.)
[The cease and desist order] will not be directed against the use
of propaganda or the use of persuasion, or against the use of
any of the other peaceful methods of organizing employees.36
Significantly, in deference to the fears of some Senators that this
section might be read to mean that peaceful activities by unions to
persuade employees to join would be prohibited, the words "to in-
terfere with" were deleted from the amendment.3 7
It was repeatedly asserted by its sponsors that in 8(b) (1) (A)
Congress was dealing with "threats or false promises or false state-
ments ;,,3s "the coercion of goon squads and other strong-arm orga-
nizing techniques ;-39 "threats of violence or of reprisal ; '40 and
direct interference by "mass picketing and other violence."'4' Read
as a whole, the legislative history strongly suggests that Congress
intended by this section to eliminate physical force, threats, and in-
timidation which would actually coerce employees in their choice
of a representative, as opposed to the incidental effect on employees
of the economic pressure which peaceful picketing and related activi-
ties exert on the employer.
D. The Relevance of Section 8(b) (4)
As the majority opinion somewhat candidly admits, the real
basis for its decision in Curtis is the economic harm to an ostensibly
neutral employer. However, the legislative history of the act clearly
indicates that 8(b) (4)4-2 is the section which is directed toward pro-
35. 93 Cong. Rec. 4436 (1947).
36. Ibid.
37. Id. at 4020-25, 4270-71.
38. Id. at 4016.
39. Curtis Bros., Inc., Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report and Recom-
mended Order, Case No. 5-CB-190 at p. 8 (1956).
40. 93 Cong. Rec. 4434 (1947).
41. Id. at 4435.
42. 61 Stat. 141-42 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1952).
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tecting neutral employers from unlawful economic pressures by un-
ions. Clause B of this section prohibits secondary strikes, boycotts
and picketing to compel an employer to deal with an uncertified
union. Clause C specifically prohibits primary strikes and picketing
to gain recognition where another union has been certified by the
NLRB. Primary picketing after a no-union vote, as in Curtis and
Alloy, and picketing after a decertification petition, 3 have not been
prohibited.44
Especially relevant to the facts presented by the Curtis and
Alloy cases is a discussion by the joint congressional committee
which was established to study and investigate the field of labor-
management relations and to recommend legislation to the Congress.
Senator Ball, chairman of the committee, made the following obser-
vation in his report to the Senate:
The Taft-Hartley law's only limitation [on recognition picket-
ing] is that provided by section 8(b) (4) (C). The right to strike
for recognition is only foreclosed when another labor organiza-
tion has been certified as the bargaining representative.
A labor organization may lose an election in which it was the
only union on the ballot and the next day call a legal strike to
force the employer to recognize it as the bargaining agent for
those employees who have just rejected it.4 5 (Emphasis added.)
It is apparent that the economic pressure of picketing has pre-
cisely the same effect on an employer and his employees after a
no-union vote, as the economic pressure which is exerted by picket-.
ing after another union has been certified. If Congress so clearly
intended to prohibit this conduct, seemingly it would have added the
appropriate language to 8(b) (4) (C).
In point of fact, the "watch dog committee" considered an
amendment to the act which would provide some relief to employers
being picketed after an election had resulted in repudiation of the
union. The committee rejected the suggestion with the statement
that "further experience with the act is advisable before considera-
tion is given to broadening section 8(b) (4) (C).'41 This provision is
not, of course, in the present statute except as it has been read
into the law by the Curtis and Alloy cases under the guise of inter-
pretation of 8(b) (1) (A).
43. See Painters' Dist. Council No. 6, Brotherhood of Painters, AFL
and The Higbee Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951) (where the Board held that
picketing for the purpose of causing the employees to withdraw a decertifica-
tion petition does not violate 8(b) (1) (A)).
44. In its discussion of 8(b) (4), the Conference Committee Report
observed that the "primary strike for recognition (without a Board certifica-
tion) was not prohibited." H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947).
45. S. Rep. No. 986, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 70-71 (1948).
46. Id. at 71.
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E. The Relevance of Section 8(c)
The Board's theory that minority recognitional picketing is
"coercive" within the meaning of section 8(b) (1) (A) was extended
in the Alloy case to include publication of a "we do not patronize"
list containing the employer's name. In this case the Board reasoned
that it was not material whether the "economic coercion" was ap-
plied through picketing the premises of the employer, through the
use of oral appeals to consumers, or through "unfair" lists dis-
tributed to consumers and suppliers. The Board stressed the fact that
the effect of such conduct is "to threaten the employer's business and
necessarily the employees' job security. '4 7 Thus, it is likely that all
minority union activity which may exert economic pressure on
an employer is suspect, and likely to constitute a violation of
8(b) (1) (A).
"We do not patronize" lists are essentially appeals to consumers
not to patronize a firm which is nonunion. That Congress had no
intention of prohibiting such methods, merely because of the
possibility of an adverse economic effect on employees if the appeals
are successful, seems obvious in light of section 8(c). This section
provides that the "expressing of any views, argument, or opinion
.. shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice...
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit."48
Since there was no evidence in the Alloy case that the distributed
lists contained threats of force or reprisal for noncompliance, the
Board's holding is necessarily based on the premise that mere
distribution of such a list is in itself "coercive" of employees. The
sweep of this doctrine is apparent. It leaves little vitality to the con-
gressional direction that argument and persuasion were not to
constitute or be evidence of unfair labor practices. "It erects some
formidable hurdles for unions to surmount in winning bargaining
rights for new units of employees." 49
This section of the act lends considerable weight to the argument
that in 8(b) (1) (A), Congress was dealing with physical force,
threats and intimidation by unions to compel individuals to join,
rather than the indirect effect which might result from applying
economic pressure on the employer.
47. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1060.
48. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1952).
49. Lab. Rel. Rep. (41 Analysis 6-7) (1957).
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F. The "New" Test of Coercion
The decisions in Curtis and Alloy are not objectionable merely
because of the Board's startling construction of the legislative intent
behind 8(b) (1) (A), or because of the'apparent disregard for the
principle of stare decisis. More significant is the far-reaching effect
of its theory of "coercion." The best illustration of the sweep of this
theory can be seen in the Alloy case. There the Board makes it clear
that rejection bythe employees in an election is not an essential ele-
ment of the unfair labor practice. Picketing for recognition in any
case in which the union does not represent a majority of the em-
ployees apparently violates section 8(b) (1) (A).
Further, this new theory casts considerable doubt on the legality
of organizational activities of labor unions. By emphasizing that the
purpose of the union activity in Curtis and Alloy was improper in
that it sought immediate recognition by a union which did not rep-
resent a majority of the employees, the Board was able to refrain
from specifically ruling on the legality of minority picketing for or-
ganizational purposes. The Board intimates, with no suggestion of
the criteria which it will use, that in such a case it will undertake
the "difficult and delicate responsibility" of attempting to balance
the conflicting interests and rights. 0 However, it is extremely
doubtful that the Board will not extend the holding of these cases
to all picketing by a minority or stranger union. To fail to do so
would be to permit the legality of picketing to depend upon its pur-
pose or objective. Since it appears obvious that the objective of
picketing cannot influence its nature or its effect upon employees or
employers, it would be unrealistic to cling to such a distinction.
Picketing for organizational purposes of course exerts the same "co-
ercive" force on any dissenting employee as does picketing for rec-
ognition. Significantly, the Board expressly recognizes this and
stresses not the purpose of the union activity, but its economic effect
on employer and employee.51
More important from a practical standpoint, if the legality of
union activity were to depend solely upon its purpose, labor orga-
nizations could avoid the force of this decision by carefully direct-
ing their appeals to consumers or employees. As long as the union
does not seek the "unlawful" objective of immediate recognition,
such activity seemingly would be lawful. In fact, the Board in Curtis
dismisses this possible'loophole by stating: "even assuming... that
all picketing was aimed at consumers, its coercive effect upon the
50. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1028.
51. Id. at 1027, 1059-60.
[Vol. 42:459
employees who desired to continue working was not thereby less-
ened ...if anything, the 'consumer appeal' argument of the Re-
spondent stresses all the nwre the economic coercion intended by the
Union's picket line."'5
2
Of course, in all union activity the eventual objective is recogni-
tion as bargaining agent. If the union is naive enough to "intend"
immediate recognition, it violates the act. The Board will, if it ad-
heres to this distinction, find itself embroiled in the impossible task
of determining subjective intent of a union which is admittedly bent
on eventual recognition. This will likely lead to imputation of the
motive of immediate recognition. The objection to such a course,
aside from any practical difficulty, is that it may lead to the imputa-
tion of such motive where none in fact exists. It has been argued
that when courts "wish to enjoin picketing it is labeled 'recognition;'
when they feel it should not be enjoined, it becomes 'organization-
al'.",3 Illustrative of this perhaps, is the Alloy case, where after the
election the union activity complained of was directed at consumers
exclusively. Nevertheless, the Board found a violation of 8(b) (1)
(A) because the union was "intent on securing exclusive recogni-
tion" as the employees' bargaining agent.54
Thus, it can be seen that the Board has either: (1) placed itself
in the anomalous position of differentiating between conduct which
has the same economic effect on employees and which is indistin-
guishable by use of objective criteria; or, (2) decided that all pick-
eting by minority or stranger unions is unlawful in that it constitutes
a violation of 8(b) (1) (A). Although the Curtis theory of coercion
would logically support the latter position, the objections to such an
interpretation of 8(b) (1) (A) seem manifest.
It will certainly be difficult for the Board to find congressional
intent which would justify proscription of all minority picketing and
related activities. To reach such a result by interpretation of the
somewhat ambiguous language of section 8(b) (1) (A) would rele-
gate the specific provisions of section 8(b) (4) to mere redundancy,
and would ignore the congressional attempt in 8(c) to protect argu-
ment and persuasion. It is significant to note that both the bill
passed by the House55 and an early committee version of the Senate
Bill "" contained provisions which would have made all minority
52. Id. at 1027. (Emphasis added.)
53. Vladeck, Organizational and Recognition Picketing, New York Uni-
versity Eighth Annual Conference on Labor 207 (1955).
54. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1059.
55. See Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act
158 (1947).
56. Id. at 112.
19581 NOTE
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
picketing illegal. These provisions are not, of course, a part of the
present statute. They should not be read into the law by administra-
tive action.
Moreover, a determination that all minority picketing is to be
prohibited is a policy decision of the greatest magnitude. Important
but conflicting interests must be considered and weighed. The de-
sirability of protecting a neutral employer from economic harm is
persuasive. It is, of course, important to protect the individual em-
ployee's freedom to accept or reject union representation. The pub-
lic has an interest in protection from unproductive strikes and other
concerted activities. However, the interest of the union in strength-
ening its position by spreading organization must not be overlooked.
Before bargaining patterns are established, employees must be or-
ganized. "Should the law not recognize that even if the picketing
union is not yet the employee's organization, nevertheless the out-
siders have a very real interest in spreading union organization in
order to protect the union wage scale and labor standards against
the competition of low cost goods ?,,-1 And, should the union not
have an opportunity to publicize to sympathetic consumers its dis-
pute with a non-union shop? Perhaps employees, influenced by the
union's show of strength, will change their minds and vote for
organization.
Although Congress has indicated its policy to favor collective
bargaining, it has also indicated its policy to favor employees' free-
dom of choice.58 It has not clearly indicated its policy when these
interests collide. In such an explosively controversial area, and in
light of the prior experience with the "unlawful objectives" approach,
it would seem preferable to await such a policy decision by Con-
gress. 59
III. CURTIS AND ALLOY: THE CASE FOR
The decisions of the NLRB in Curtis and Alloy present two
broad issues: one a question of authority, the second a question of
propriety. Initially it must be determined whether the NLRB can
subject all minority picketing and related activity to regulation un-
der section 8(b) (1) (A). (As to this issue it is imperative to note
that regulation is not a synonym for prohibition.) This determina-
57. Cox, Some Current Problems in Labor Law: An Appraisal, 35
L.R.R.M. 48, 56 (1954).
58. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
59. Cf. Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1957), where the
authors suggest "remanding" the problem of enforcement of collective bar-
gaining agreements and federal substantive law in such cases to Congress for
more definite legislation.
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tion will be facilitated by examining the intent of Congress in pass-
ing 8(b) (1) (A); the limitations imposed on its use by earlier
Boards; and the implicit authorization to be derived from the gen-
eral tenor and structure of the act.
Assuming that these examinations support the conclusion that
the NLRB can regulate minority picketing and related activity un-
der S(b) (1) (A), the second broad issue is whether the NLRB
should regulate such activity. Consideration will be given to the
dangers of immunizing any of these activities, and the Supreme
Court's tacit approval of regulation of minority activities. Assum-
ing that there is sufficient justification for regulating such minority
activity, final consideration will be given to the proposition that the
only appropriate and effective means of regulation is to permit the
NLRB to adopt a broad interpretation of 8(b) (1) (A).
A. The NLRB Was Not Precluded From Adopting a Broad
Interpretation of Section 8(b) (1) (A)
Legislative history
The legislative history of 8(b) (1) (A) is inconclusive. It does
not clearly demonstrate that Congress intended to restrict the appli-
cation of 8(b) (1) (A) to picketing accompanied by violence or
threats against specific individuals. Nor does it conclusively demon-
strate that Congress intended to apply 8(b) (1) (A) to all minority
activity. However, it does supply the Board with some support for
the position taken in Curtis and Alloy. This support is found in cases
of peaceful minority picketing which were introduced as examples
of "coercion." While it is not argued that these examples constitute
an overwhelming preponderance in favor of regulation of all minor-
ity activity under 8(b) (1) (A), they do rebut any claim to a pre-
ponderance of a contrary interpretation which would restrict the
application of that section to picketing accompanied by violence or
threats against specific individuals.
In introducing 8(b) (1) (A) as an amendment, Senator Ball
described as "coercion" a case where the union continued to picket
after it had been rejected by the employees. He pointed out that:
None of the employees have left their jobs and the sole purpose
of the picket line is to intimidate, coerce and force ... employees
to accept Local No. 886 as their bargaining agent, notwithstand-
ing the decision of the employees to the contrary. 0
Senator Taft then offered the NLRB case of Hall Freight Lines"'
60. 93 Cong. Rec. 4017 (1947).
61. Hall Freight Lines and Local 705, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL, 65 N.L.R.B. 397 (1946).
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to demonstrate that economic pressure by a minority union could
readily induce the employees to reject a prior decision not to join
the union. When Senator Pepper objected that the case did not in-
volve physical threats, 2 Senator Taft replied:
The main threat was, 'Unless you join our union, we will close
down this plant, and you will not have a job.' That was the
threat, and that is coercion - something they had no right to
do. 3 (Emphasis added.)
Senator Taft then demonstrated that this type of "coercion" could
be effectively directed at all the employees, not just union members,
by referring to a case where the union said:
'We want to organize your employees. Call them in and tell them
to join our union.' The employers said, 'We have not any control
over our employees. We cannot tell them [to join] under the
National Labor Relations Act.' They said, 'If you don't, we will
picket your plant; and they did picket it, and closed it down for
a couple of months. Coercion is not merely against union mem-
bers; it may be against all employees. 64
Senator Taft then offered the pertinent conclusion that these exam-
ples demonstrate that "there are plenty of methods of coercion short
of actual physical violence."65 (Emphasis added.)
However, it is argued that these examples are irrevelant because
if Congress had intended to restrain minority picketing where the
employees have repudiated the union, it would have done so under
8(b) (4) (C) 61 which provides that it shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for a union to picket for recognition where another union has
been certified as the bargaining representative. This argument is
usually supported by reference to a report of the "watchdog com-
mittee"' 7 in 1948 which states that minority recognition picketing
is not a violation of the act and suggests that the only appropriate
method of outlawing such picketing would be to amend 8(b) (4)
(C). In reality this report is post legislative history which overstates
the Board's interpretation of the act in Perry Norvell."8 This report
was designed merely to present the existing interpretation of the act
and cannot be used as evidence of what Congress intended when it
passed the act.
Furthermore, it would seem that the presence of 8(b) (4) (C)
can be explained as a desire on the part of Congress to set apart
62. The NLRB had specifically found that there was no violence or
threats of violence. See 65 N.L.R.B. at 402.
63. 93 Cong. Rec. 4023 (1947).
64. Id. at 4024.
65. Ibid.
66. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (C) (1952).
67. S. Rep. No. 986, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 70-72 (1948).
68. 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948).
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specific acts of picketing because it considered their objects so
oppressive that they warranted a special remedy- the mandatory
injunction.D However, it does not follow that this "singling out"
process was intended to be the only restriction on picketing or other
minority activities. It would appear that Congress intended that
8(b) (1) (A) should also apply to minority activity including pick-
eting, but the exact extent of regulation cannot be conclusively
ascertained.
Due to the presence of conflicting statements in the legislative
history, there is no clear legislative intent to restrict the application
of 8(b) (1) (A). Thus, the NLRB was not precluded from adopting
a broad interpretation of that section.
Prior case law
The earlier Board decisions in National Maritime UnionT0 and
Perry Norvell7' interpreted 8(b) (1) (A) as outlawing only that
picketing which was accompanied by physical violence or threats of
reprisal against specific individuals. On the basis of the foregoing
analysis of the legislative history, it would seem that the earlier
Board adopted too restrictive an interpretation of 8(b) (1) (A) .72
Perhaps the present Board would have been required to examine
the earlier decisions more critically if the original restriction on the
application of 8(b) (1) (A) had been consistently followed. How-
ever, the use of 8(b) (1) (A) was not limited to picketing accom-
panied by violence or threats against specific individuals. An out-
standing example of this deviation is the decision in Clara-Val,73
where the Board found a violation of 8(b) (1) (A) in a threat to
strike to force an employer to discharge an employee who had
crossed a picket line. The threat of economic reprisal was not con-
fined to the specific individual but directed at the job security of all
the employees.
7 4
69. The chief legal officer or the regional attorney is ordered under§ 10(1) of the Taft-Hartley Act, to give priority to 8(b) (4) (C) charges, and
petition for an immediate injunction if he has reasonable cause to believe that
the charge is true. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1)(1952).
70. 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 985 (1948).
71. 80 N.L.R.B. at 239.
72. Aside from an erroneous interpretation of legislative history, Na-
tional Maritime and Perry Norvell must be distinguished from the instant
case on their facts. In NMU, the strike was conducted by a majority; while
in Perry Norvell, the question of whether the strikers represented a majority
or minority was never decided because it was immaterial to the theory on
which the case was tried and decided.
73. 87 N.L.R.B. 703 (1949).
74. The Board stated that if the union succeeded in its threat, "the dis-
charge and the reason for it would inevitably become known to the other
employees, and would coerce and restrain them to join the Union or retain
their membership in it." 87 N.L.R.B. at 705.
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Other inconsistent applications of NMU occurred in Great At-
lantic and Pacific Tea Co.7 - and in Peerless Tool.7 0 In the former
case, the Board found a violation of 8(b) (1) (A) where the union
did not picket but threatened to secure the discharge of any union
member in bad standing. In Peerless Tool the Board found that a
threat to refuse to process the grievance of any union member in bad
standing violated 8(b) (1) (A). In both of these cases the union's
attempt to effectuate discipline was directed at all the employees, not
just specific individuals. 7 7
However, it is argued that the prior case law interpreting 8(b)
(1) (A) is significant because it repeatedly rejected the theory that
peaceful inducements to customers which indirectly threaten the job
security of employees is "coercion." While this argument ignores
cases like Pinkerton"'s7 8 and Capital Service v. NLRB7 which found
an 8(b) (1) (A) violation in peaceful picketing directed at custom-
ers, its chief failing is that it is supported by only one case, Watson's
Specialty Store. It is true that in that case the Board refused to find
that peaceful picketing directed at consumers was a violation of
8(b) (1) (A), but the strength of that case as establishing a "long
line of cases rejecting the present theory of coercion"80 is question-
able. In fact, the dissent in Curtis and Alloy apparently did not con-
sider the case important enough to warrant citation.
Structure of the act
As noted above, the legislative history is inconclusive as to the
exact limitations that Congress intended to place upon the interpre-
tation and application of 8(b) (1) (A). Thus, in the absence of a
75. 110 N.L.R.B. 918 (1954).
76. 111 N.L.R.B. 853 (1955).
77. A more recent application of this principle appeared in Local 886,
Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO and Unit Parts Co., 119 N.L.R.B.
No. 34, Lab. Rel. Rep. (41 L.R.R.M. 1056) (1957). In that case the Board
found an 8(b) (1) (A) violation where a certified union which already repre-
sented a majority, refused to sign a wage contract with the employer unless
eighty per cent of the employees joined the union. The Board reasoned that
the threat to withhold benefits of a contract was economic coercion designed
to force employees to join against their will.
78. 90 N.L.R.B. 205 (1950).
79. 204 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 347 U.S. 501
(1954). In this case the court of appeals reproached the Board for not
finding that peaceful picketing by a minority union was a violation of
8(b) (1) (A) because:
Here is more than an appeal to the employees to persuade their action.
Here is successful economic coercion tending to prevent them from exer-
cising their right to work by diminishing the public consumption of the
product of their work. 204 F.2d at 853.
The court justified this result by concluding that Congress intended "re-
straint and coercion" be used consistently in 8(a) (1) and 8(b) (1) (A).
80. See text p. 466 suepra.
[Vol. 42:459
clear legislative intent, the Board quite properly turned to the literal
words of the act to determine the application of 8(b) (1) (A). It
found that under the literal reading:
If minority union picketing has a restraining or coercive effect
upon the employees, and if such coercion cuts into their privilege
to choose or reject any particular union, the only 2 essential
elements of the unfair labor practice spelled in Section 8(b) (1)
(A) have been established.8 '
At first glance it would appear that to define "coercion" in terms
of "coercion" is circular. However, the key to the present interpre-
tation and application of 8(b) (1) (A) is that the Board apparently
considers the section a general enforcement provision which will en-
able it to effectuate the policies of the act. In reality it would seem
that the Board made a policy decision that the minority activity
present in Curtis and Alloy was contrary to the general tenor of the
act, and having once determined that it was not bound by any clear
restrictions, it worded those decisions in terms of "coercion."
This approach is neither shocking nor dangerous. The Board
has consistently utilized it in applying section 8(a) (1).8z There
has never been any question of abuse in using 8(a) (1) as a general
enforcement provision. The similarity in the wording of the two
sections and the numerous references in the legislative history to the
effect that 8(b) (1) (A) was to be used in the same manner as
8(a) (1), 3 lend considerable support to the argument that Congress
intended both sections to be general enforcement provisions, one
directed at unfair labor practices of employers, the other to apply to
acts of unions. It is not reasonable to assume that Congress was not
aware of the effectiveness of 8(a) (1) as a general enforcement tool
or that it cast 8(b) (1) (A) in the same frame but intended the
Board to use it in a very limited manner. It would seem that the
justification for the general language of 8(a) (1) could well apply
to 8(b) (1) (A). Congress could not specifically enumerate every-
thing that it sought to prohibit, nor did it desire to foreclose regula-
tion of future variations on existing unfair labor practices. 84 In
81. 41 L.R.R.M. at 1026.
82. Perhaps the clearest demonstration of the broad scope of 8(a) (1)
is found in the fact that a violation of any subsection of 8(a) is also a violation
of 8(a) (1). See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 432-33(1941).
83. See, e.g., the statement of Senator Smith who was a member of the
committee which drafted 8(b) (1) (A): "The only intent is to prevent re-
straint or coercion by a labor organization or by employers, and we think the
rules should be the same for one side as for the other." 93 Cong. Rec. 4435
(1947). See also id. at 4021, 4432, 4434.
84. The intent in passing the original 8(a) (1) and its relationship to
other employer unfair labor practices, was stated in a senate report on the
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accord with the accepted theory of administrative regulation,"' it
enacted 8(a) (1) and 8(b) (1) (A) and left to the Board the job of
implementing the general policy laid down by the act.
But it is argued that the test of "coercion" advanced in Curtis
is subject to abuse and not susceptible of control, therefore Congress
could not have authorized such an interpretation. The argument
seizes on the majority's test of coercion and concludes that it could
be applied to all picketing because implicit in all picketing is a threat
to the security of the employees."6 Quite obviously this is an attempt
to compel the majority to expand its interpretation and application
of "coercion" to the point where it would fall of its own weight. The
argument ignores the fact that the majority's test of coercion is
limited by the provisions of section 7.8T For example, a majority
strike for recognition cannot deprive the minority of any rights
because they have lost their right to choose their own representative
under the "majority rule" principle" of section 7. However, when a
majority of employees exercise their right under section 7 to refrain
from selecting a union, the present test of coercion applies and the
minority is forbidden from engaging in any activity which jeopard-
izes the job security of the majority. It appears that it would be
immaterial whether the picketing was for recognition or organization
if it in fact seeks reprisal for exercise of a protected right.
Thus, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to restrict the
interpretation and application of 8(b) (1) (A), the NLRB could
properly infer that Congress intended that section to be regarded as
a parallel to 8(a) (1) and used as a general power to effectuate the
policies of the act.
B. All Minority Picketing and Related Acts Should be Subject
To Regulation by the NLRB Under Section 8(b) (1) (A)
Assuming that the NLRB can regulate all minority picketing
Wagner Act. "The four succeeding unfair-labor practices are designed not
to impose limitations or restrictions upon the general guaranties of the first,
but rather to spell out with particularity some of the practices that have been
most prevalent and most troublesome." Legislative History of the National
Labor Relations Act 2309 (1935).
85. See Davis, Administrative Law 54-59 (1951).
86. See 41 L.R.R.M. at 1035.
87. Id. at 1028.
88. This principle is spelled out in § 9(a) of the act which requires that
the bargaining representative be "designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes... " See, e.g., NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324
(1946); NLRB v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501 (7th Cir.
1954). See also Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act
2312-13, 2336-37 (1935).
89. See 41 L.R.R.M. at 1025, 1059.
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and related activities under 8(b) (1) (A), it is necessary to deter-
mine whether the Board should regulate such conduct.
In Curtis and Alloy the Board found that the purpose of the
minority picketing was to gain recognition."9 Assuming that this
finding is supported by the facts, the policy considerations dictating
restriction of this activity are apparent. What the union seeks to gain
can only be obtained by an illegal capitulation. Either the employer
will be forced to accede to the demand and recognize a union repre-
senting only a minority (if any) of his employees as the exclusive
representative of all his employees, or, he will be forced to go to his
employees and persuade them to accept a union which they have
just rejected. It is immaterial whether he "persuades" them by
merely suggesting that they reconsider their choice, or by telling
them that unless they agree to accept the union he will have to
cease operations. In either recognizing the minority union outright
or persuading his employees to accept it, he violates both section
8(a) (1) and 8(a) (2). 0
However, a far more difficult problem is presented where it is
not clear that the union is seeking recognition. Assuming that the
facts in Curtis and Alloy do not compel the conclusion that the
union was seeking recognition, but was merely organizing, or as-
suming that there is no reliable means of distinguishing between
organizational and recognition picketing, the question becomes one
of determining what considerations would support restriction of
minority activity regardless of its purpose. It is not the intention of
this examination to advocate prohibition of all minority activity, but
rather to present the policy considerations that argue that all
minority picketing and related activities should be subject to regula-
tion under 8(b) (1) (A). 91
Dangcrs of immunizing any minority picketing or
related acts from regulation.
Inherent in all picketing and related acts is the presence of
potential or actual economic pressure, regardless of the number of
participants'- Therefore, it would appear that minority picketing
and related acts should be subject to regulation merely because they
could exert substantial economic pressure. If allowed to exist with-
90. See, e.g., I. Spiewak & Sons and Amalgamated Clothing Workers,
CIO, 71 N.L.R.B. 770 (1946); Midwest Piping and Supply Co. and United
Steel Workers, CIO, 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
91. The discussion will be primarily limited to picketing. However, in
view of the extension in Alloy of 8(b) (1) (A) to a "we do not patronize"
list, and consumer appeals, other facets of minority activity must also be sub-jected to these considerations.
92. See note 25 supra.
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out regulation, these activities could be utilized to effectively de-
stroy the free choice of employees. Those employees who would
be forced into joining the union may tend to be disinterested in the
policies and leadership of the union. As a result of this apathy, irre-
sponsible leadership could be created which would operate to the
detriment of the public and the union movement in general. Further,
complete immunization of any minority picketing and related acts
could promote irresponsible organization. With license to use coer-
cive organizational tactics, the union may be encouraged to recruit
more members than it can adequately service.
It could be argued that organizational picketing and related
activity by a minority union should be immune from regulation so
as to allow the minority union to compete with the employer's
natural advantage to discourage organization. However, it would
seem that the employer's position alone does not justify complete
immunity. Further, it must be noted that it would be anomalous to
grant the minority union license to utilize any economic pressure to
encourage union membership while retaining the present restrictions
on the employer's use of such pressure to discourage organization. 3
The union should also be subject to regulation in their use of eco-
nomic pressure and:
The Board should be vigilant to see that what was sauce for the
goose under the Wagner Act is now sauce for the gander under
the Taft-Hartley Act.9 4
Both Curtis and Alloy presented another aspect of immunizing
any minority picketing or related activity. These cases involved
activity by a minority union which had just lost a Board conducted
election. 5 Although the majority of the Board in Alloy indicated
that the presence of an election is not an essential factor,"" it is
obvious that whenever coercive minority activity is continued be-
yond the time when the union has been rejected by the employees in
a Board election, it must be restrained because it is clearly con-
trary to section 997 of the act. The purpose of section 9 is to provide
a means of resolving a question of representation so that the em-
ployer-employee relationship may function smoothly. 98 Congress
93. See, e.g., Beaver Machine & Tool Co. and United Steelworkers,
CIO, 101 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1952); Lane Drug Stores, Inc. and Retail Clerks,
AFL, 88 N.L.R.B. 584 C1950). Perhaps the most liberal view in this area is
found in National Carbon Co. and United Gas Workers, CIO, 65 N.L.R.B.
830 (1946).
94. Capital Service, Inc, v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1953).
95. See note 11 supra.
96. See note 10 supra.
97. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1952).
98.' See Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act 2976-77(1935).
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considered the element of stability in the representation of employees
so important that it made the results of a Board election binding for
at least a year."" It devised a rather elaborate procedure to insure a
fair and accurate election. To permit a union to lose an election one
day and resume picketing the next, destroys this stability, encour-
ages rejected unions to utilize picketing as a means of displaying
their pique, and operates to create an atmosphere of tension and
mistrust. The net result is that the Board, by conducting an election,
has only succeeded in determining that the employer is engaged in
interstate commerce.
Not only does the continuance of minority activity after a Board
election endanger industrial security, but it substantially damages
the prestige and efficiency of operation of the NLRB. If the Board
cannot insure that an election will actually resolve a question of
representation, it would be a waste of time and money to initiate a
representation petition. Faith in the ability of the Board to protect
the rights of those who honestly seek the protection of its processes
must be insured. The ability of the Board to effectively resolve
labor disputes depends upon the degree of respect accorded its
agents and procedures. The only manner in which this respect can
be maintained is to prohibit those activities which deliberately defy
the power and prestige of the NLRB.
The Supreme Court has recognized that minority picketing
and related activity can be subject to regulation.
Since 1949, the Supreme Court has adopted the position that
peaceful picketing is more than free speech.100 As a result, the Court
has consistently permitted state regulation of peaceful minority
picketing where it violates established state policy. 0' Recently,
in Teamsters v. T7 ogt, 0 2 the Court appeared to give tacit approval
to restraint of peaceful minority activity under the Taft-Hartley Act.
In that case, the Court upheld the validity of a Wisconsin statute
making it an unfair labor practice to picket peacefully to force an
employer to recognize a union that did not represent its em-
99. Section 9(e) (2) provides that "No election shall be conducted ...
in any bargaining unit ... within which, in the preceding twelve-month pe-
riod, a valid election shall have been held." 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2) (1952).
100. The trend started in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490 (1949). See also Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950);
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
101. See Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Garner v. Team-
sters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S.
532 (1950).
102. 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
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ployees.103 The Court agreed with the state court that the picketing
was "to coerce the employer to put pressure on his employees to
join the union, in violation of the declared policy of the State," and
concluded, "For a declaration of similar congressional policy see
Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act."
10 4
The willingness of the Court in these cases to view "free speech"
as a limited concept in the field of labor relations would seem to indi-
cate that it would consider customer appeals and "We do not
patronize" lists in the same light as minority picketing. Certainly
they represent an integral part of a scheme which exerts substantial
economic effect on the employees. But the problem of whether the
Court would declare them to be within the protection of "free
speech," or whether it would limit the permissible use of such de-
vices, is conjectural at this point. Vhat is material is that the Court
has not specifically foreclosed the argument that these related activi-
ties should be subject to regulation.
The only effective method of regulating minority picketing
and related activity is to allow the NLRB to place a broad
interpretation on section 8 (b) (1) (A).
In considering whether minority activity should be regulated
under 8(b) (1) (A), the argument is frequently made that the only
appropriate remedy for the problem of minority activity would
be for Congress to legislate specific amendments to sections, such as
8(b) (4) (C), that would delineate exactly what acts could be re-
strained. However, the presence of many "pressure" groups, with
special interests to protect, guarantees that the process of amending
the Taft-Hartley Act will be difficult and time-consuming.
Furthermore, specifically amending the Taft-Hartley Act cannot
be the sole answer. To limit union unfair labor practices to specific
acts and repeal the general enforcement provision, only encourages
evasions around the specifics. To solidify the law in this manner
would deprive the NLRB of the power to restrain conduct which is
clearly contrary to the policies of the act, until Congress amended
the statute. Congress never intended such a result. It granted the
Board the discretionary power to determine what will effectuate the
103. Wis. Stat § 111.06(2) (b) (1953), makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employee individually or in concert with others to "coerce, intimidate
or induce any employer to interfere with any of his employees in the enjoy-
ment of their legal rights. .. .
104. 354 U.S. 284, 294 (1957). See also Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S.
485 (1953), where the Court observed that picketing to coerce employers into
compelling or influencing their employees to join the union was within the
scope of federal power. "In language almost identical to parts of the Pennsyl-
vania statute, [Congress] has forbidden labor unions to exert certain types of
coercion on employees through the medium of employers." Id. at 488-89.
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policies of the act,10 5 and by enacting 8(b) (1) (A), it equipped the
Board with a flexible means of enforcing those policy decisions.
A return to a restrictive interpretation of 8(b) (1) (A) would be
undesirable. The Board must be free to interpret the act in the
light of the highly volatile conditions in the field of labor relations.
What today is clearly contrary to the purposes of the act was barely
conceived as a threat to industrial stability ten years ago. The Board
must be equipped with a device to meet these new complications. The
development of 8(b) (1) (A) as a general enforcement provision in
the hands of a competent and judicious Board is the only effective
means of accomplishing this end.
IV. SYNTHESIS
Any determination of the permissible scope of minority picket-
ing and related activities is basically a policy decision. Three con-
flicting interests must be weighed: (1) the interest of the employer
in carrying on his business free from interference; (2) the interest
of a labor organization in promoting unionization as a means of
raising the standards of labor; and (3) the interest of the employee
in being free to join or not to join a labor union.
Although it seems clear that the employer's right to carry on his
business was earlier thought to be paramount, the era of the New
Deal effected a reversal of this feeling, giving predominance to the
unions' interest in organizing on an industry wide basis. The Taft-
Hartley Act attempted to restore a more equitable balance, and in-
jected a policy determination seeking to protect the individual
employees' interest in freedom of choice. The act does not, however,
provide an adequate direction for balancing these conflicting interests
in those cases, such as peaceful minority picketing and related activi-
ties, that do not fall within its specific provisions. Such direction
is necessary. This might be accomplished in any of several ways.
Congress might feel it desirable to outlaw all minority picketing
and related activities, or to permit all such activities if conducted in a
peaceful manner. Specific prohibitions of certain types of
union activity might be codified or the problem might
be left fully within the discretion of the NLRB to determine when
and in what manner certain union conduct is to be regulated.
105. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193 (1941), where
the Supreme Court described the Board as an:
.... agency of Congress for translating into concreteness the purpose of
safeguarding and encouraging the right of self-organization.... [I]t acts
in a public capacity to give effect to the declared public policy of the Act
to eliminate and prevent obstructions to interstate commerce ....
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However,.it would seem preferable, considering both the expertise of
the Board and the policy making function of Congress, that Con-
gress do no more, nor no less, than formulate a policy decision as
to which interest---employer, employee, union-must prevail when
in irreconcilable conflict. This would leave to the Board the respon-
sibility of determining when these interests do in fact conflict, and
what remedy would best effectuate this policy determination.
Whatever may be the proper solution, an intensive examination
into the criteria previously adopted by the Board and the courts, and
a re-evaluation of their effectiveness is called for. Certainly violence,
threats, intimidation, and false propaganda should be considered as
factors in determining when union conduct should be regulated.
However, to condone all activity which is free from these elements
would seem to be unsound, since it ignores the harmful economic
effect of some "peaceful" union conduct. Similarly, the objectives
test adopted in the Curtis case appears unsatisfactory. This test
attempts to distinguish between the motives of "recognition" and
"organization." Since the facts in nearly every case will give rise to
an inference of either motive, the "objectives" test should not be
relied upon as a realistic tool for determining legality of union
conduct.
What is called for is a rejection of conceptualistic formulas.
Needed is a factual inquiry into the actual effect of certain union
activity; the necessity for its use to achieve the unions' purpose; and
the alternative methods which might reasonably be used and their
effectiveness.
Initially, it would appear that no union activity which is peace-
fully conducted should be restrained until the union has been proven
to be a minority in a Board election. The determination of minority
status on the basis of an unofficial election is certainly susceptible of
abuse and rarely would permit complete freedom of choice. A Board
election is the only reliable means available for determining the
choice of employees in a relatively neutral atmosphere.
Further, the union should be permitted to use peaceful activity,
including picketing, for a reasonable length of time prior to a Board
election, in order to demonstrate the union's effectiveness and its
benefits to the employees. The determination of what is a reasonable
length of time should turn on the facts of the particular case. For
example, a reasonable length of time for a union to have the oppor-
tunity to organize a textile mill in Alabama will be longer than a
reasonable time necessary for a union to make its appeal to the
employees of a retail dry-goods shop in Detroit. After the union
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has had a reasonable opportunity to organize, this activity should
be construed to raise a question of representation which will support
a petition for election.
Once an election is held and the employees cast their ballots for
"no union," it would appear that little useful purpose can be served
by permitting the union to continue its activities for recognition.
However, after losing such an election, the union certainly has a
valid and continued interest in publicizing that: (1) the welfare
of its organized shops will be endangered by competition from
nonunion shops; and (2) it seeks to persuade the employees who
have just rejected it to reconsider their choice after the one-year
election bar expires.
The means of publicizing these interests should not be com-
pletely restricted, nor should they be immune from regulation. They
might be subjected to a "reasonable alternatives" test. Factual in-
quiry should be made to determine the relative effectiveness of
picketing, unfair lists, publication through newspaper ads, and so
forth, in order to determine whether or not one method might not
be as effective in publicizing the union's interests as another more
harmful method. Furthermore, this test should be extended to the
methods themselves. For example, if it is determined that picketing
is the only effective way for a union to publicize the fact that a retail
establishment is nonunion, and thus invite sympathetic consumers
to patronize elsewhere, that picketing would not be restrained if
used in a reasonable manner under the literal application of the
"availability of alternative means" test. However, it may be con-
fined to consumer entrances. On the other hand, at a manufacturing
establishment, picketing might be prohibited altogether but the use
of unfair lists permitted.
The criteria of a proven minority and availability of alternative
means are of course not a panacea. However, the suggested approach
seems clearly preferable to the continued use of conceptual solutions
which are rigid, unrealistic and unworkable.
